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In this paper we examine the relationship between wages, labour productivity and ownership 
using a linked employer-employee dataset covering a large fraction of the Czech labour market 
in 2006. We distinguish between different origins of ownership and study wage and productivity 
differences. The raw wage differential between foreign and domestically owned firms is about 
24 percent. The empirical analysis is carried out on both firm- and individual-level data. A key 
finding is that industry, region, and notably human capital explain only a small part of the 
foreign-domestic ownership wage differential. Both white and blue collar workers as well as 
skilled and unskilled employees obtain a foreign ownership wage premium. Foreign ownership 
premia are more prevalent in older and less technologically advanced firms. Joint estimation of 
productivity and wage equations show that, controlling for human capital, the difference in 
productivity is about twice as large as the wage differential. The results indicate that the 







JEL Codes J31, D21 
 
Keywords Foreign ownership, wages, productivity 
 
Acknowledgements We would like to thank participants of the EALE annual meeting in Tallinn 2009, 
Trexima seminar 2008, a VSB conference in Trojanovice 2009, and a seminar at Hitotsubashi University 
2009 for several useful comments, in particular to Uwe Blien, Jaromír Gottvald, Sauro Mocetti,  Ryo 
Kambayashi, Tsuyoshi Tsuru and Roope Uusitalo. We are also grateful to Pavel Mrazek and Vladimir 
Smolka at Trexima for valuable advice and assistance with the data. Part of this research has been funded 
by a grant from the Tuborg foundation for research on the labour market consequences of 






In recent years a relatively large literature has built up that compares wage and productivity 
levels between domestic and foreign owned firms and attempts to explain the observed 
differences. All studies, using firm as well as worker level data, show that the foreign owned 
firms outperform the domestic ones with respect to pay levels.
1 The literature can be divided into 
two categories: studies comparing domestic and foreign owned firms (see e.g., Conyon et al. 
(2002), Girma et al. (2001), Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004), Martins (2004)) and investigations 
focussing on the wage consequences of observed changes in ownership (Huttunen (2007), 
Heyman et al. (2006), Martins and Esteves (2008), Earle and Telegdy (2008)). The former 
examine the importance of differences in observable characteristics of the firms as well as their 
employees, whereas the latter exploit panel data and use fixed effects or difference-in-difference 
methods to control for unobservables.
2 
Summarising briefly the key findings of earlier studies, they are: (i) the foreign ownership 
premium is considerably larger in less developed countries, (ii) the premium estimates from 
estimations on firm level data are as a rule higher than those estimated on individual data, (iii) 
inclusion of firm and/or worker traits significantly reduces the foreign-domestic differential (and 
also between developed and less developed countries), and (iv) accounting for unobservables 
reduces the premium estimate further towards close to zero. Firm characteristics that turn out to 
be especially important are company size and industry affiliation.
3 Corresponding  employee 
traits are human capital variables (education, training and experience).
4 Data in these studies 
come both from advanced economies (U.S., U.K., Germany and the Nordic countries) and less 
developed countries like Indonesia, Ghana and Mexico.  
As noted above, the findings differ considerably between developed and less developed 
countries. It is not obvious that the results obtained either for mature, advanced market 
economies or less developed countries also hold for the new market economies in Central and 
Eastern Europe. In these countries there is lively debate on the pros and cons of foreign direct 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive survey describing the design and the key results of 18 studies, see Andrews et al. (2009). 
2 These studies do not include Greenfield births which make up a non-negligible portion of foreign owned firms 
(also in the CEE countries) and are likely to differ from the acquired companies.  
3 These results are interpreted as evidence of multinational firms entering industries with higher profits. 
4 This is considered as evidence of a sufficiently large pool of specialists in the local labour market playing an 
important role in international investors’ location decisions. Thus, employees in general do not necessarily enjoy a 




investments, which are often encouraged by the local governments (for Czech Republic see e.g. 
Kohout, Lidove Noviny, 2005). A common notion is that the location of foreign owned firms in 
these countries are driven by search for lower costs of production, and labour costs in particular, 
and that foreign investors are operating “sweatshops” in CEE countries. Another motivation for 
locating there is the closeness to new expanding markets (see Konings and Murphy, 2006). In 
neither case is it obvious that the foreign owned firms would pay their employees more. On the 
other hand, in post-transition economies where skills learned in successful multinational 
companies is a particularly scarce resource, foreign firms may, in order to retain their employees 
and not loose the investments made in them, pay their workers a wage premium. Thus, one aim 
of this paper is to provide evidence on this matter from the Czech Republic, a country with one 
of the highest FDI inflows among the CEE countries, and to inform the ongoing discussion about 
the pros and cons of attracting foreign investors. To the best of our knowledge, only one earlier 
study has dealt with ownership wage premiums in a CEE country context, namely Earle and 
Telegdy (2008), who compare wages in public, private and foreign owned firms in Hungary. 
In this paper we examine the relationship between wages, labour productivity and ownership for 
the Czech labour market using a linked employer-employee dataset covering a large fraction of 
the Czech private sector labour market. We distinguish between different origins of owners and 
study wage and productivity differences. In our individual level analyses we distinguish between 
employee categories (type of work, skill levels) and in the firm level analysis between young and 
old firms and technologically advanced and less advanced firms. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly summarises earlier 
research on the topic. Section 3 describes the data used and Section 4 contains the results of the 
empirical analysis. In the fifth section we discuss the results and offer some conclusions. 
2 Previous Research and Hypotheses Development 
It is by now considered as a stylized fact that foreign owned firms have higher productivity and 
pay higher average wages than domestically owned firms. Does this imply that wages will rise in 
a domestic firm after it has been acquired by a foreign investor? Does the existence of a foreign 
ownership wage premium mean that foreign Greenfield births pay higher wages than similar 
domestic firms? The answers to these questions depend on what gives rise to the foreign-
domestic wage differential. Although there is no lack of suggestions for explanations and despite 




differences has not yet been arrived at. One obvious fact is that foreign owned firms are typically 
located in certain industries and regions. In advanced industrialised countries you often find 
them in high wage sectors and/or regions where sufficiently large pools of specialists are located. 
But a number of studies that control for firm characteristics find foreign ownership wage premia 
also within industries or regions. 
A number of hypotheses have been put forward to explain the ownership premium. One is that 
foreign owned firms employ workers who possess higher qualifications and are rewarded 
accordingly. The reason for why multinational firms employ employees with more human capital 
is that the success of firms in international markets is due to having higher quality capital, 
tangible as well intangible, and hence, they need more skilled labour to work with it. This 
implies that it is not only employees working in foreign owned firms who receive a premium but 
also those employed in domestically owned multinational firms receive a premium.  Heyman et 
al. (2006) provide evidence from Sweden that there is no premium associated with foreign 
ownership per se. 
In many countries, local as well as national governments seek to attract foreign investors hoping 
that there will be positive (technological, skills and knowledge) spillovers from the foreign firms 
to the local companies
5. If these spillover effects are significant, this would imply that, at least in 
the medium or longer term, the foreign-domestic wage differential would be smaller. On the 
other hand, multinational firms are likely to be aware of these spillovers and therefore attempt to 
prevent them by means of paying higher wages in order to reduce labour turnover; see Fosfuri et 
al. (2001) for an analysis. 
A growing number of studies have tried to find empirical evidence of spillover effects as well as 
of their magnitude. A study making use of panel data on U.K. firms, Haskel et al. (2007), (see 
also Fu (2008)), finds positive spillover effects, whereas some studies using similar data from 
transition economies, Konings (2001) for Bulgaria and Romania, Javorcik (2004) for Lithuania, 
and Djankov and Hoekman (2000), Sabrianova et al. (2005) Ayyagari and Kosová (2009) and 
Kosová (2009) for the Czech Republic, find, except for the two last mentioned studies, no or 
only limited evidence of their existence. Some recent studies have focussed on knowledge 
spillovers by considering what happens to the wages of employees working for a foreign 
                                                 
5 FDI is often actively encouraged from the local governments in the form of e.g. tax holidays, preferential loans, 




employer when they move to domestically owned firms. Three studies (Andrews et al. (2009) for 
Germany, Balsvik (2006) for Norway, and Pesola (2007) for Finland) find evidence of foreign-
to-domestic firm moves having a positive impact on the employee’s wage, while the studies by 
Martins (2005) and Martins and Esteves (2008) on Portuguese and Brazilian data respectively, 
find the opposite: movers from foreign to domestic firms take wage cuts. From this rather mixed 
bag of results, one may conjecture that spillovers are more likely to materialise in advanced 
economies with a relatively high proportion of skilled workers in the labour force.
6  This in turn 
implies that the likelihood to observe foreign ownership premia is higher in countries like for 
instance the Czech Republic
7.  
A distinguishing feature often attributed to foreign firms is that they exhibit different patterns of 
labour demand. In particular, it is claimed, and standard models of trade support this notion 
(Fabbri et al., 2003), that multinational firms have a more elastic demand for labour than 
domestic firms (save domestically owned multinationals). If this is the case, it is conceivable that 
employees in foreign firms are paid more in order to compensate for the higher insecurity in 
employment. 
The empirical evidence on the matter is quite mixed, however. Barba Navaretti et al. (2003) and 
Balsvik and Hammer (2007) find that the multinationals’ labour demand is in fact less elastic 
than that of domestic firms because of the higher skill levels of their workforces. On the other 
hand, Görg et al. (2006) do find a considerably higher elasticity in international companies 
operating in Ireland, while Hakkala et al. (2007), who compare domestic firms with foreign-
owned and domestically owned multinationals in Sweden, do not find any differences in labour 
demand elasticity between the three ownership types. 
Still another explanation for the observed wage differential is rent sharing within multinational 
companies. More specifically, within foreign owned firms profits may be shared with workers 
across borders; for evidence that this indeed occurs, see Budd et al. (2006) who make use of data 
from a panel of European firms.  
 
 
                                                 
6 This would be consistent with country pattern of the results. Also Pesola’s (2007) finding, that it is only employees 
with higher education that obtain wage gains when moving from foreign to domestic firms, is consistent with it. 
7 Note that the Czech Republic has one of the lowest proportions of university educated people in the OECD; see 




3 Data Description 
We use a linked employer-employee data set that includes all workers from 3,272 companies in 
year 2006.
8 This has been provided to us by a private consulting company which produces wage 
and wage costs statistics for the Czech Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The data set 
contains information about individual workers, their age, gender, education, occupation, workers 
firm tenure, hourly wage, annual working hours, total annual compensation as well as its wage 
and bonus components. The hourly wage information is of very high quality as it is calculated by 
the employer in order to estimate the employee’s vacation and absence pay. Thus, by using the 
hourly wage reported by the employers we avoid measurement errors arising from division of 
aggregate income by the number of standard working hours. The data set provides some 
information about firm characteristics, such as industry (3-digit NACE), the region of the firm’s 
operations, and most importantly for the current paper, type and origin of ownership.
9 A firm is 
defined as foreign owned when at least 50 percent of the equity is in foreign hands. In addition, 
we have received firm-level financial information collected from firms’ balance sheets and 
income statements by Creditinfo Czech Republic and from these data we have retrieved 
information about firms’ sales, profits, fixed assets, materials, value added and information on 
technological development of firm such as expenditure on R&D, software, licenses, patents and 
other forms of know-how. We merged these data with our linked employee-employer data. 
Table 1 gives some basic descriptive statistics for the sample of firms for year 2006. More 
precisely it contains the number of firms, their average size (as measured by number of 
employees) and the average hourly wage for five groups of countries for the origin of the owners 
plus the Czech Republic. Most foreign-owned firms are, not surprisingly, from the Western 
European countries
10 (in  particular  Germany,  Netherlands, Austria, France and Switzerland) 
followed by other European countries (in particular the neighboring CEE countries Slovakia and 
Poland, and Cyprus) and the U.S. Firms with owners from Asia account for a tiny proportion of 
foreign owned firms. Note, however, that the Asian owned firms are larger than other firms and 
thus their relative share of total employment is about the same as that of the other European 
countries. 
                                                 
8 We have also had access to corresponding data for 2005. The descriptive statistics as well as the regression 
estimates from this year are very similar and are therefore in order to save space omitted from the subsequent tables. 
9 For more information about the data set, see e.g. Eriksson and Pytlikova (2004) and Eriksson, Pytlikova and 
Warzynski (2009). 




Table 1: Descriptive statistics, year 2006  




Sum of workers 
employed 
Average hourly 
pay (CZ Koruna) 
Western Europe  527  696  366,728  151 
 
Other Europe  31  418  12,944  153 
Asia 12  930  11,149  114 
United States   18  694  12,486  183 
Czech Republic  2,184  376  820,842  118 
4 Empirical Analysis 
Figures 1 and 2 show the log wage and log labour productivity distributions for domestic and 
foreign owned firms, respectively.  







































From these it clearly stands out that a significant part of the foreign firms’ wage distribution lies 
to the right of that of the domestically owned firms. The difference in average productivity is 
even larger. F-tests of equality of variances showed that dispersion of wages is significantly 
larger among foreign owned firms but does not differ with respect to labour productivity. 
  
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the sub-samples of foreign and domestically 
owned companies, respectively. From this we may notice that employees in foreign owned firms 
on average are younger and have a shorter tenure at their current employer. This is not surprising 
in view of the fact that in Czech Republic foreign owned firms for obvious reasons are younger. 
The differences in schooling levels are minor as are differences in the share of white collar 
employees. Foreign owned firms have, not unexpectedly, almost twice as large share of foreign 
employees and, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, a higher share of female employees. Foreign 
firms are predominantly operating in the manufacturing industry and are twice as often as 





However, there are also differences between the foreign firms, depending from which region the 
owners come from. Firms from other CEE countries and the U.S. employ a higher proportion of 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 






Average age (years)  42.2 37.5 37.6 39.2 34.1 37.0 
Average tenure (years)  8.2  5.8  5.8  7.3  4.1  6.4 
Share of employees (%) 
Vocational training  13.7  13.5  14.1  7.6  13.3  6.1 
University level education  10.0 11.1 10.6 16.6  6.5  18.8 
Females  37.2  43.1  43.4  37.9  42.0  40.9 
White collar workers  44.3 43.3 42.3 56.9 27.0 57.2 
Foreign employees  24  4.4  3.7  14.7  13.7  4.1 
Other (%) 
Prague region  12.7  25.2  24.7  25.8  8.3  50.0 
Mining, manufacturing  37.7 63.4 63.8 45.2 100 61.1 
Retail  12.0  11.9  11.8  19.4  0  11.1 
Hotels, transport  7.0 5.6 5.5 3.2  0 16.6 
Banking  1.7  6.0  6.1  3.2  0  11.1 
Business services  9.9 7.3 6.6  25.8 0  0 
Education, health and culture  7.9  2.4  2.9  0  0  0 
No of Firms  2184  587  527  31 12 18 
 
university-educated people and (consequently) white-collar workers, whether Asian owned firms 
have the lowest share of university-educated and white-collar workers. Yet, firms from the two 
regions of origin also share some similarities as they employ a much larger share of foreign 
workers compared to the other foreign firms and domestic companies. There are also differences 
between the different regions of origin with respect to industry and region, in which the firms 
operate. Compared to domestic and other foreign firms, companies from other CEE countries are 
much more represented in retail and business services. U.S. owned firms are more present in 
hotel and transportation, banking and manufacturing industries. Half of the U.S. owned firms are 
located in Prague. All Asian owned firms carry out their activities in manufacturing and mining 




Before we turn to consider the econometric estimation results, it should be emphasized that our 
analysis focuses exclusively on the foreign-domestic wage and productivity differentials and that 
we will not examine changes in wages in connection with changes in ownership. The reason is 
that in Czech Republic (and in other post-transition countries) the ownership change is often a 
rather patchy process where there is not only one event of ownership change but a whole series 
of them. Thus, the consequences of the ownership changes are hard to describe as results of well 
defined treatment effects. 
4.1 Firm level analyses 
We begin with analyses of firm level data, i.e., regressions where the dependent variable is the 
average firm wage. As can be seen from the first column of Table 3, the raw difference in 
average wages between foreign and domestically owned firms is 23.6 percent. When accounting 
for differences in the compositions in firms’ workforces (as measured by firm means and 
standard deviations of age and firm tenure, share of female employees and employees with 
foreign citizenship, and employees’ educational qualifications), the difference changes by merely 
two percentage points. Note, that at the same time, the R
2 jumps from 0.065 to 0.61, implying 
that a substantial fraction of the variation in firm wages is in fact due to differences in workforce 
structures. Adding regions, industries and firm size to the regressors reduces the differential to 
16 percent. Thus, about two thirds of the raw foreign-domestic firm-wage differential remains 
after all the explanatory variables have been entered. 
In Table 3, columns 3 and 4, we divide foreign owned firms into four groups of countries of 
origin: the 15 old EU member states + countries belonging to the European Economic Area + 
Switzerland – henceforth called Western Europe, other European countries, Asia and the United 
States. The unconditional differences relative to domestic firms vary substantially: the difference 
is 24 per cent for the Western European countries, 22 per cent for other European countries and 
41 per cent for the U.S. owned companies. There is no significant pay difference between 
domestic firms and the Asian owned firms. Controlling for human capital, firm size, region and 
industry, the differentials shrink for the Western Europe group by a third, for American firms by 
more than half, and it is halved for the other European countries group. Thus the average 
differential masks considerable heterogeneity across owner-country groups. 
It should be noted that although we include relatively many firm characteristics in the 




the foreign owned firms are significantly larger (and larger firms have typically been found to 
pay higher wages) but in our analysis all firms have the same weight. Furthermore, our firm-
level aggregate variables we have used to describe differences in workforce composition may not 
be capturing the full extent of employee heterogeneity. However, as we will see below, this 
conjecture is to only be confirmed to a limited extent by the estimations carried out on the 
individual level data. 
 
Table 3: Firm-level wage regressions 
Firm  level  variables  1 2 3 4 
Foreign   0.236***  0.162***  - - 
     [0.017]  [0.013]  - - 
Western Europe  - -  0.236*** 0.169*** 
    - -  [0.018] [0.014] 
Other Europe   - -  0.218*** 0.103* 
    - -  [0.066] [0.044] 
Asia   - -  -0.003 0.035 
     - -  [0.110] [0.073] 
US   - -  0.412*** 0.157** 
 -  -  [0.086] [0.057] 
Average age  -  -0.010***  -  -0.010*** 
 -  [0.001]  -  [0.001] 
St dev age  -  -0.006  -  -0.007* 
     -  [0.003]  -  [0.003] 
Average tenure  -  0.013***  -  0.013*** 
 -  [0.002]  -  [0.002] 
St dev tenure   -  -0.006*  -  -0.006* 
     -  [0.003]  -  [0.003] 
Share females  -  -0.419***  -  -0.419*** 
     -  [0.022]  -  [0.022] 
Share foreigners  -  -0.300***  -  -0.284*** 
  -  [0.053]  -  [0.054] 
Share no or primary  -  -0.055  -  -0.054 
   -  [0.133]  -  [0.133] 
Share vocational training  -  -0.114***  -  -0.117*** 
  -  [0.031]  -  [0.031] 
Share university degree  -  1.501***  -  1.502*** 
  -  [0.042]  -  [0.042] 
Regions, Industry, Size  -  Yes  -  Yes 
Observations  2,754 2,754 2754  2754 
R-squared    0.065 0.607 0.067 0.607 





4.2 Individual level analyses  
Turning to the estimations where the units of observation are individual employees – see Table 4 
– we may first notice that the unconditional foreign ownership premium is now considerably 
lower than for firm average wages
11 – 7 per cent – as was also observed by Heyman et al (2006) 
and Martins and Esteves (2008). Secondly, and more importantly, when we enter human capital  
Table 4: Individual-level wage regressions 
Firm level variables  1  2  3  4 
Foreign   0.068*** 0.144***  - - 
     [0.001] [0.001]  - - 
Western Europe  - -  0.069*** 0.147*** 
    - -  [0.001] [0.001] 
Other Europe   - -  0.119*** 0.084*** 
    - -  [0.005] [0.004] 
Asia   - -  -0.099*** 0.118*** 
     - -  [0.007] [0.005] 
US   - -  0.062*** 0.159*** 
 -  -  [0.005] [0.004] 
Average age  - 0.020*** - 0.020*** 
  - [0.000] - [0.000] 
St dev age  - -0.025*** - -0.025*** 
     - [0.000] - [0.000] 
Average tenure  - 0.024*** - 0.024*** 
  - [0.000] - [0.000] 
St dev tenure   - -0.044*** - -0.044*** 
     - [0.000] - [0.000] 
Share females  - -0.207*** - -0.207*** 
     - [0.001] - [0.001] 
Share foreigners  - -0.025*** - -0.023*** 
  - [0.002] - [0.002] 
Share no or primary  - -0.199*** - -0.199*** 
   - [0.006] - [0.006] 
Share vocational training  - -0.175*** - -0.175*** 
  - [0.001] - [0.001] 
Share university degree  - 0.633*** - 0.633*** 
  - [0.001] - [0.001] 
Regions, Industry, Firm Size  - Yes -  Yes 
Observations  1,015,027 1,015,027 1,015,027 1,015,027 
R-squared   0.004 0.446 0.005 0.446 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
                                                 
11 This differential is moreover significantly lower than what is observed by Earle and Telegdy (2008) for Hungary 





variables, firm size, region and industry dummies to the wage regression, the differential 
increases substantially. In the full model, the foreign ownership premium is twice as large as the 
unconditional difference: 14 per cent. This number differs only a little from the corresponding 
estimate from the firm level regression which was 16 per cent. Thus, the individual level 
estimates do not seem to capture much additional employee heterogeneity.
12 
When we next distinguish between different origins of foreign ownership – see columns 3 and 4 
in Table 4 – we find that the unconditional premium is highest for firms owned by investors from 
non-Western European countries, followed by American and Western European firms, whereas 
individuals employed in firms with Asian owners receive a lower wage than workers in 
domestically owned firms. (The differences relative to the average foreign ownership premium 
in Table 5 are much smaller than the corresponding differences for firm wages.) After 
controlling for the same regressors as before, we can observe an increase in the premium for 
employees in Western Europe- and U.S.-owned firms and a small decrease in the wage premium 
in firms with the other European owners. The premium for employees in Asian owned firms 
turns positive and is now just below that of Western European and U.S. owned firms. Thus, the 
results in Table 4 reflect the marked differences in human capital, industry affiliation and firm 
size between firms with owners from different groups of countries shown in Table 2. Accounting 
for these differences significantly affects the wage premium estimate.  
 
4.2.1 White- and blue-collar workers 
Next, we examine whether the wage premium paid by foreign firms differs between white- and 
blue-collar workers. This is motivated by the expectation that if foreign firms pay their 
employees a premium to reduce labour turnover, this is likely to accrue mainly to white-collar 
workers through whom most of the potential knowledge transfer would occur. However, as can 
be seen from Table 5 both categories of employees receive a premium and the differential 
between white- and blue-collar workers is only about 4 percent. This small magnitude calls into 
doubt the notion that foreign firms pay a wage premium to their employees to prevent knowledge 
                                                 
12 We estimated the firm level regressions by WLS using firm size as weights, obtaining estimates (available from 





13  As before, the premium increases as we account for human capital, region and 
industry.      
Table 5: Individual wage regressions, white-collar and blue-collar workers 
  White Blue White Blue White Blue White Blue 
Foreign  0.111*** 0.070*** 0.169*** 0.131***         
  [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]  [0.001]      
EU15/EEA         0.108***  0.074***  0.170***  0.138*** 
       [0.002]  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Other Europe        0.253***  0.009  0.162***  -0.028*** 
           [0.008]  [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] 
Asia         0.086***  -0.095***  0.162***  0.083*** 
           [0.014]  [0.006] [0.011] [0.004] 
US         0.047***  0.105***  0.166***  0.173*** 
           [0.008]  [0.004] [0.006] [0.003] 
Human capital, 
firm size 
No No Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes 
Regions, Industry    No No Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes 
# observations  468,072 546,883 468,072 546,883 468,072 546,883 468,072 546,883 
R2    0.008 0.010 0.453 0.427 0.009 0.012 0.453 0.429 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
When we distinguish between owner-country groups, some differences surface again. The 
conditional wage premia for employees in Western European and U.S. enterprises are quite 
robust to differences in specification and are very close to those observed in the aggregate.  We 
may note that the difference between blue- and white-collar workers’ premia is rather small, with 
U.S. firms paying higher wage premia to blue-collar worker than to white-collar workers, the 
opposite what we would expect according to the “prevention of worker turnover” hypothesis. 
Asian firms pay both categories of employees a wage premium - in the unconditional model they 
actually pay less to blue collar workers than domestic firms do. The wage premium is about 
twice as large for white-collar employees than for blue-collar workers. In line with the 
hypothesis we find that firms with owners from “other Europe” pay their white-collar workers 
                                                 
13 As a robustness check we have also distinguished between high-skilled employees (with university or vocational 
education) and workers with lower skills (with basic, low and general secondary education). The estimates are very 
similar to those in the Table 7: a very small difference between the two skill groups is found for the foreign 
ownership premium. The same pattern emerges when we distinguish between different ownership regions. These 




more than domestically owned firms do, while their blue-collar workers receive 3 per cent less 
than employees in Czech owned firms.  
 
4.2.2 Firm age, level of technology and unions 
 
Next we add dummies capturing age of firms and level of technology they use, and their 
interactions with foreign ownership dummy into the regressions. The motivation for doing this is 
twofold. First, we would like to test whether the foreign wage premium is paid as a mean to 
compensate for job uncertainty. We would expect that jobs in younger firms are less secure, and 
hence, younger foreign owned firms pay higher premia the older companies. Second, we expect 
the more technologically advanced firms to have a stronger interest in retaining their employees 
and consequently, foreign firms that use more advanced technologies pay a wage premium for 
keeping valuable employees with firm- or industry-specific skills and knowledge.  
 
We defined a firm as “old” if the average tenure of its five most tenured employees exceeds 12 
years. We choose 12 as this implies that the firm existed prior to the main privatization processes 
in the Czech Republic. Thus, the younger firms are more likely to be foreign owned Greenfield 
births
14  whereas the older companies mainly consist of former domestic firms acquired by 
foreign investors. We defined technologically advanced firms as firms with above-mean value of 
expenditures on R&D, software, licenses, patents and other know-how. Applying these 
definitions to our sample firms, we may note that 58 percent of the foreign firms are old 
compared to 68 percent of the domestic firms and 17 percent of the foreign are more 
technologically advanced, which is almost twice as large a proportion of the Czech firms (9.6 per 
cent). 
 
The estimates of the main and interaction effects are given in Table 6. The first column presents 
results from firm level regressions whereas the second column is based on individual level 
data.
15 We find quite similar patterns in the estimates from firm and individual level regressions. 
As for the main effects, we find that foreign owned firms pay a wage premium and that 
technologically more advanced firms do, too. The foreign ownership premium estimates is 
halved when age of firm and technology as well as their interactions are included. In the 
                                                 
14 Some of them can of course also be foreign acquisitions of very young domestic firms.  
15 Note that because the technology variable is not available for all companies, the estimation sample is smaller than 




individual level regression older firms attach a negative coefficient, but not in the firm level 
analysis. All interaction terms are insignificant in the firm level regression while they are 
positively signed and differ from zero in the firm level regressions. However, their magnitudes 
are tiny. All in all, the estimates provide no support for the hypothesis that foreign wage premia 
are compensating for higher job insecurity and the hypothesis that the premium is a retention 
device gains only weak support. 
 
 
Table 6: Firm- and individual-level wage regressions with firm age and technology dummies 
and their interactions 
  Firm level  Individual 
level 
Foreign  0.111*** 0.111*** 
  [0.024] [0.002] 
Old  0.005 -0.060*** 
  [0.020] [0.002] 
Old*Foreign  0.035 0.011*** 
  (0.028) [0.002] 
HighTech  0.094*** 0.092*** 
  [0.025] [0.001] 
HighTech *Foreign  -0.040 0.006** 
  (0.038) [0.002] 
Human capital  Yes Yes 
Regions, Industry, firm size   Yes  Yes 
# observations  1378 700778 
R2   0.652 0.433 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Human capital, firm size, region and industry 
dummies are included as controls. 
 
 
Finally, some words about the possible influence of trade unions. An argument sometimes made 
is that foreign investors pay a wage premium to prevent the workplaces from becoming 
unionised. There are number of reasons for why we do not think this carries much weight, at 
least not in the case of Czech Republic. First, after the collapse of the Communist system under 
which union membership was mandatory, people have been rather sceptic of unions. Second, 
unions are much less present in the young, post-1994 firms
16 and if the wage premium would be 
used to keep unions out, then we would observe a higher premium in the younger foreign owned 
                                                 
16 Of the firms in our estimation sample with no collective wage agreement, at the firm or industry level, 65 percent 




firms, and we do not; see Table 6. Third, we added dummies for collective agreements (at firm 
or industry level) as measures of union presence to the individual level wage regressions and 
obtained very small “union membership premium” estimates: typically 1 percent or below for 
firm level agreements and negative estimates for industry level agreements. Thus, unions’ 
influence on wages seems to play a minor role and would hence not be a major concern of 
foreign investors. 
 
4.3 Wage and productivity differences 
Next, we approach the question why foreign firms pay higher wages than domestic ones from 
another angle by considering to what extent the pay differences are (merely) reflecting 
differences in productivity. Recall that in Figures 1 and 2 we showed that the differences in 
productivity between foreign and domestic firms seem to exceed those in wages. A simple 
regression of firm-level production functions with foreign ownership dummies document large 
productivity differences between domestic and foreign owned firms. The difference ranges from 
47 to 39 per cent when log sales and log value added are used as dependent variables, 
respectively. 
 It thus seems natural to ask whether the differences in wages between foreign and domestic that 
remain after controlling for human capital, industry and location reflect differences in 
productivity. These could be due to use of superior capital and production technology but could 
also arise because of differences in intangibles (like management style, work organization, 
branding, etc.).  
In the sequel we will use the firm level data to compare productivity and wages and to test for 
whether the foreign ownership premium is associated higher productivity. Following Brown and 
Medoff (1978), Hellerstein and Neumark (1999) and Hellerstein et al. (1999) we jointly estimate 
firm level production functions and hourly wage functions and compare the relative marginal 
products and relative wages across firm types (and for various demographic groups
17). The wage 
equations are essentially the same as those presented earlier (only the estimation sample is 
slightly different due to somewhat less availability of adequate data on sales or value added 
which are our measures of output). Thus, we allow productivity to vary with the composition of 
                                                 
17 As for demographic variables it should be noted, however, that our results do not allow us to distinguish between 
two explanations: that the demographic group in question has a lower productivity or that the group is 




the firms’ workforces and by industry and region. Note that to the extent that biases due to 
unobservables affect our estimated productivity and wage differentials similarly, they do not 
affect our comparison of relative productivity and wages. 
Once we have estimated the two equations we can make use of a Wald test to test for equality of 
the foreign-domestic productivity and wage differential estimates. Table 7 reports results of the 
joint estimation of the Cobb-Douglas production functions
18  and wage equations. In the 
production functions we use two alternative dependent variables, sales and value added, and we 
use three input factors: number of employees, physical capital and materials. The third and sixth 
columns contain the Wald tests. 
 
Table 7: SUR estimates of wage equations and production functions
a 










          
Foreign owned  0.258***  0.156*** 4.05** 0.274***  0.153*** 8.75** 
  [0.054]  [0.016]  [0.045]  [0.015]  
Age  -0.044*** -0.015*** 23.80*** -0.035*** -0.014*** 21.60*** 
  [0.006]  [0.002]  [0.005]  [0.002]  
Tenure  -0.009 0.007***  10.24*** 0.005 0.007***  0.37 
  [0.005]  [0.002]  [0.004]  [0.001]  
Share females  -0.639*** -0.405***  6.29***  -0.615*** -0.409***  7.66** 
  [0.099]  [0.029]  [0.081]  [0.027]  
Share foreign workers  -0.236  -0.170 0.05 -0.391  -0.272***  0.31 
  [0.314]  [0.094]  [0.235]  [0.078]  
Share no education  0.813  -0.004 0.53 -0.040  -0.195 0.10 
  [1.197]  [0.358]  [0.526]  [0.176]  
Share lower secondary  -0.307* -0.132**  1.86  -0.089  -0.092*  0.00 
  [0.137]  [0.041]  [0.107]  [0.036]  
Share university degree  2.829*** 1.835*** 16.10*** 2.339*** 1.688*** 14.18*** 
  [0.264]  [0.077]  [0.189]  [0.062]  





   K,L,M 
 
  
Controls: region, industry  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   
Constant  13.140*** 4.676***    10.999*** 4.688***   
 [0.106]  [0.031]    [0.088]  [0.029]   
Observations  1091 1091    1553 1553   
Adjusted R-squared  0.825 0.622    0.837 0.586   
a Note that all continuous variables have been de-meaned. 
b Test of difference in estimates equal to zero. 
 
                                                 
18 As a robustness check we also estimated more flexible translog production functions obtaining very similar 




Beginning with the productivity differentials we may note that firms with an older workforce, 
higher shares of female employees, less educated workers and foreign workers have lower 
productivity. The ceteris paribus level of total factor productivity level in foreign owned firms is, 
26-27 percent higher than in the domestic firms. Thus, a notable fraction of the raw productivity 
differential – 47 and 39 per cent as measured by log sales and log value added, respectively – can 
be explained by differences in human capital, region and industry. In fact, the proportion 
attributable to these factors is vastly higher than in the case of firm-level wages.  
When we again distinguish between the four different owner-country groups, see Table 8, we 
find that firms with owners from the Western Europe and the United States are considerable 
more productive than domestic firms and the other foreign firms. The Western European and the 
U.S. wage differential with respect to the domestic firms is about half of the productivity 
difference. 
Table 8: SUR estimates of wage equations and production functions, by continents of origin
a 
 
  Log sales  Log hourly 
wage 






Wald test (chi2 
(1))b 
Western Europe    0.290*** 0.169***  5.26**  0.323*** 0.160*** 14.99*** 
    [0.056]  [0.016]  [0.046]  [0.015]  
Other Europe   -0.089  0.033  0.50  -0.316*  0.070  7.09*** 
    [0.184]  [0.055]  [0.158]  [0.053]  
Asia   0.015  0.011  0.00  -0.457*  -0.020  4.23** 
      [0.262]  [0.078]  [0.232]  [0.078]  
US   0.315  0.173*  0.38  0.441*  0.196**  2.03 
      [0.246]  [0.073]  [0.188]  [0.063]  




Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
# observations  1,091 1,091    1,553 1,553   
R2    0.826 0.625    0.840 0.587   
a Note that all continuous variables have been de-meaned. 
b Test of difference in estimates equal to zero. 
 
A comparison of the estimated wage and marginal productivity differentials shows that the 
foreign firms’ marginal productivity is clearly higher than their relative wage. Consequently, if 
the foreign owned companies would pay their employees their marginal productivity, the wage 
gap between foreign and domestic firms would be almost twice as large as now. In general we 




reflect differences in marginal products. The only exceptions are the estimates to the share of 
foreign workers, to the share of workers with lower education and to tenure when value added is 
used as the dependent variable. For employees with a university education the difference is 
particularly large: their wage is considerably lower than their contribution to productivity. 
Notably, the gender wage gap is smaller (especially when sales is the dependent variable in the 
production function) than gender productivity gap.
19 This is not consistent with notions of wage 
discrimination, although it should be noticed that we cannot account for gender segregation in 
the estimations. 
 
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Summing up, we find that location in industry or region plays only a marginal role in explaining 
the wage differential between foreign and domestic firms. Thus, the bulk of the ownership 
difference in pay is within industry and region. Strikingly, the differential is not explained by 
differences in human capital. Unlike in some other countries, foreign multinational firms in 
Czech Republic do not employ more highly qualified labour than domestic firms. This indicates 
that rather than the closeness to new markets, the location decision of foreign investors have 
mainly been driven by the lower wage costs. Controlling for human capital variables leads to 
only a small reduction in the foreign ownership premia in the firm-level analysis, and actually 
gives rise to an increase in the differential in the individual-level regressions. 
Having ruled out location and human capital as the main drivers of the foreign ownership 
premium, remaining candidate explanations are rent-sharing and payment of higher pay as a 
means to reduce worker turnover and knowledge spillover. Beginning with the latter, we would 
expect this motive to be more important for white collar workers or more skilled employees. Our 
findings suggest that the premium is indeed higher for white collar workers but the difference 
relative to the blue collar workers is quite small and that the corresponding difference between 
employees with different skill levels is also very small. When distinguishing between firms 
which used more advanced technology and those that do not, the difference in foreign ownership 
was negligibly small. Consequently, the results do not lend support to the prevention of spillover 
hypothesis. The observed wage premia do not seem to compensation higher job insecurity as 
                                                 
19 Dong and Zhang (2009) also find that the relative wage of unskilled female workers exceeded their relative 




older foreign firms (acquired before the privatisation programmes) rather than younger firms pay 
a higher premium. 
As for rent-sharing, our joint estimation of production functions and wage equations yields 
results that are consistent with it. The lack of differences in wage premia across groups of 
employees mentioned above would reflect that rents are shared with all employees in order to 
preserve a good workplace atmosphere. The gap in labour productivity between foreign and 
domestically owned firms is about twice as large as the corresponding gap in wages. Rent 
sharing within international companies is an important, but often neglected, effect of 
globalisation on local economic outcomes.  
Estimations recognising four groups of owner countries revealed some differences between 
them. The category “other European countries (i.e, non-Western Europe, mostly neighbouring 
countries as Slovakia and Poland)” turned out to deviate most from the average picture. 
Accounting for human capital has a bigger impact on the premium for firms from these 
countries, which are like Czech Republic mainly transition economies from Central and Eastern 
Europe. They also differ in that they only pay their white collar workers a premium, whereas the 
pay for blue collar workers in these firms is even slightly below that in the domestically owned 
firms. However, these firms make up only about five percent of all foreign owned firms in our 
data set and, because their smaller average size, account for three percent of employment in 
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